Ethical issues in funding orphan drug research and development by Gericke, Christian Ansgar Otto et al.
doi:10.1136/jme.2003.007138 
 2005;31;164-168 J. Med. Ethics
  
C A Gericke, A Riesberg and R Busse 
  
 development
Ethical issues in funding orphan drug research and
 http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/31/3/164




4 online articles that cite this article can be accessed at: 
  
 http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/31/3/164#BIBL
This article cites 12 articles, 4 of which can be accessed free at: 
Rapid responses
 http://jme.bmj.com/cgi/eletter-submit/31/3/164
You can respond to this article at: 
 service
Email alerting
top right corner of the article 
Receive free email alerts when new articles cite this article - sign up in the box at the
 Notes   
 http://journals.bmj.com/cgi/reprintform
To order reprints of this article go to: 
 http://journals.bmj.com/subscriptions/
 go to: Journal of Medical EthicsTo subscribe to 
 on 11 September 2008 jme.bmj.comDownloaded from 
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This essay outlines the moral dilemma of funding orphan
drug research and development. To date, ethical aspects of
priority setting for research funding have not been an issue
of discussion in the bioethics debate. Conflicting moral
obligations of beneficence and distributive justice appear
to demand very different levels of funding for orphan drug
research. The two types of orphan disease, rare diseases
and tropical diseases, however, present very different
ethical challenges to questions about allocation of research
funds. The dilemma is analysed considering utilitarian and
rights based theories of justice and moral obligations of
non-abandonment and a professional obligation to
advance medical science. The limitations of standard
economic evaluation tools and other priority setting tools
used to inform health policy decision makers on research
funding decisions are outlined.
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I
nternational research ethics has been primarily
concerned with protecting individual partici-
pants from possible harm during the process
of research. A recent guideline has also stressed
the importance of considering access to out-
comes of research in participating communities
in low resource settings.1 However, the level,
allocation, and priority setting of resources for
funding development of new treatments have
not featured significantly in bioethics debates.
Multidisciplinary discourse on the level of
healthcare resources and their fair distribution
has long focused on existing treatments. In
recent years, international organisations have
expressed concern about the lack of research into
new treatments for health problems that are
most prominent in poor countries.2–4
Orphan drugs have been defined as drugs
unlikely to be manufactured by private industry
unless special incentives are provided by
others.5 6 The two main reasons why industry
may be reluctant to invest in research on orphan
drugs are:
N the condition is too rare to represent a
profitable market, and/or
N the condition is prevalent in developing
countries which are too poor to pay drug
prices that render the new drug profitable for
the patent holding manufacturer.
The latter are often called ‘‘neglected diseases’’
or—as in this article—‘‘tropical diseases’’ to
distinguish them from the former, the so-called
rare diseases.6
A number of industrialised countries have
passed specific legislation defining epidemiolo-
gical or/and economic criteria for designation of
orphan status and consequent incentives to
counteract the neglect of orphan diseases in
industrial research. After the launch of the US
Orphan Drug Act in 1983, Japan (1993), Taiwan
and Australia (1997), and lately the European
Union (EU) (2000) have passed laws to incite the
pharmaceutical and biotechnological industries
to pursue research on orphan drugs by providing
tax breaks and market exclusivity.6 7 In the EU, a
drug will receive orphan status designation if it is
intended for the diagnosis, prevention, or treat-
ment of a life threatening or chronically debili-
tating condition which affects not more than five
people per 10 000 in the Community (Regulation
(EC) No 141/2000). This epidemiological thresh-
old can be extended to more frequently occurring
diseases if they are life threatening, seriously
debilitating or serious and chronic at the same
time, and ‘‘if the return on the marketing of a
medicinal product would not be expected to
justify the investment in its development’’.8 In
both cases, orphan drug designation may be
obtained only if no satisfactory method of
diagnosis, prevention, or treatment exists or if
the new treatment will be of significant benefit
to those affected (Article 3 (1)b).8 In addition,
some member states grant tax credits for clinical
studies or on corporate taxes.6 The marketing
exclusivity is revoked if the manufacturer is
unable to supply sufficient amounts of the drug
or a second applicant can show that their product
is ‘‘clinically superior’’, which means more
efficacious, safer, or otherwise of significant
advantage to diagnosis or care.9 Until recently,
advocacy groups as well as private industry had
doubts whether tropical diseases that are pre-
valent in developing countries were covered by
the US or EU orphan drug legislations.3 The
European Commission has recently clarified that
drugs targeting tropical diseases are eligible for
designation if they have a low prevalence in the
European Community and meet all other criteria
of the regulation.10
The decision of how much a society should
spend on research on orphan diseases represents
a moral dilemma. On the one hand, each orphan
disease only represents a small number of
individuals within the legal and political remits
of a particular society. Investing substantial
amounts of resources for rare conditions could
be considered unethical from a utilitarian point
of view, as it is not maximising society’s benefits,
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and its opportunity cost in terms of benefits foregone
for others are important. On the other hand, many would
uphold that society has a moral obligation not to abandon
individuals who have had the bad luck to be affected by
a serious but rare condition for which no treatment exists.
Furthermore, medicine has a professional obligation to
advance scientific knowledge in pursuing new therapies.
These conflicting moral obligations appear to demand very
different levels of funding for orphan drug research and
development.
In the following discussion, we analyse this moral dilemma
according to the four principle approach of biomedical ethics
developed by Beauchamp and Childress.11 Their framework
provides an accessible and culturally neutral approach to
thinking about ethical issues in health care,12 which can be
applied to developed and developing countries alike. This
approach comprises the four prima facie principles of respect
for autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. For
this particular dilemma, the principles of beneficence and
justice are of particular relevance. The analysis of justice
will cover a utilitarian and a rights based approach. The
discussion of obligations of beneficence will cover the moral
obligation of non-abandonment and the professional obliga-
tion of medicine to promote scientific advancement. In the




Philosophical accounts interpret justice as fair, equitable,
and appropriate treatment in the light of what is due or owed
to individuals.13 Various, often conflicting, theories of justice
have been proposed. Here, we discuss a utilitarian and a
rights based approach to the dilemma of orphan drug
research funding.
Utili tarian approach
Utilitarians argue that the standard of justice depends on the
sole principle of utility, which demands that we seek to
maximise the overall good,13 or in other terms ‘‘to bring the
greatest good to the greatest number’’.14 Utilitarian thinking
forms the basis of economic evaluation, which is increasingly
used to inform priority setting decisions in health policy.
However, utilitarians disagree on which values should be
maximised.15 The commonest approaches are based on
maximising health benefits in terms of a single index
combining life expectancy and health related quality of life,
such as quality adjusted life years or disability adjusted life
years.14
Maximising principles require that health care be dis-
tributed so as to achieve maximum benefit. Need principles
require distribution of resources in proportion to need.
Egalitarian principles require resources to be distributed so
as to reduce inequality.16 Need is usually understood as
capacity to benefit from treatment or in terms of severity of
disease.14 This definition of need is difficult to apply to
orphan diseases, as capacity to benefit is usually understood
to be limited to existing treatments in order to become
operational.
According to the second definition individuals with
orphan diseases have a need, but since their condition is
infrequent, no or very few resources would be allocated
to their particular disease for the goal of maximising
society’s utility. However, all individuals with orphan
diseases taken together represent a substantial number of
people. In the EU, an estimated 25–30 million people are
affected by one of around 6000 orphan diseases.6 Two
separate questions arise:
N What level of resources should be devoted to orphan
disease research overall?
N What level of resources should be allocated to each
individual disease?
Another problem with resource allocation for research
purposes is the extreme uncertainty of benefits. In economic
evaluation, uncertainty of costs and benefits can be taken
into account in a sensitivity analysis. But the future success
of research for a particular orphan drug is too uncertain to
allow meaningful estimates. This is demonstrated by the fact
that on average only one in 10 pharmaceutical compounds
developed is successfully marketed, which means that pre-
dictions of future benefits were misguided in 90% of cases
although substantial amounts of resources are invested
for research and development for each new chemical entity.
Cost estimates for developing a new drug vary widely. Using
confidential industry data of multinational pharmaceutical
companies, DiMasi et al estimated the cost of developing a
new drug at US$231 million in 1991.17 Subsequent authors
who used the same data but changed some assump-
tions estimated the cost of developing a new drug at
US$473 million in 2000.3 More recent, independent estimates
for cash outlays including smaller pharmaceutical companies
and excluding opportunity costs for developing a new drug
are in the order of US$76–115 million including the cost of
failure.18 This corresponds to estimates for the minimum
size of a potential market of US$100 million for an orphan
drug to attract industrial interest.7
The tropical diseases definition also encompasses high
prevalence diseases that do not represent profitable markets
for industry. Today, only 10% of global health research
funding is allocated to 90% of the world’s health problems.19
But does a moral obligation to distribute resources fairly
extend to individuals outside the economic, legal, and
political remit of the society providing the research funds?
Applying traditional economic evaluation to such problems is
likely to fail, as maximising global health with national
funds of single countries would not be politically acceptable
in any country. However, international funding agencies
could maintain such aims. Another problem in defining the
boundaries of a moral obligation for distributive justice is the
fact that even when a disease is frequent in a particular
country, its importance in global or regional priority setting
may be dwarfed by conditions that are more frequent in the
sum of countries considered. The technical and political
feasibility of a health intervention has also to be taken into
account in priority setting. Intervention complexity in terms
of the nature and availability of non-financial resources
required to implement and sustain an intervention should
thus be considered alongside priority setting techniques
based on utilitarian thinking such as burden of disease
assessment and economic evaluation.20
Rights based approach
Rights are justified claims that individuals and groups can
make upon other individuals or upon society, and to have a
right means to be in a position to determine, by one’s choices,
what others should do or need not do.15 An important aspect
of rights based theory for health policy considerations is the
distinction between positive and negative rights. A positive
right requires others to do something beneficial or enabling
for right bearers, whereas a negative right requires others to
refrain from doing something, usually harmful or restrictive,
to right bearers.21
One form of positive right that has been proposed with
regard to resource allocation decisions is the right to a decent
minimum of health care. In most industrialised democracies,
institutions exist that assure everyone access to needed
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services regardless of ability to pay.21 This could be
interpreted as a legal right to health care.21 In some countries,
such as Italy and the Netherlands, the right to health care is
protected constitutionally.22 The French and German consti-
tutions contain a legal obligation to assist individuals in
danger, which could potentially apply to the development of
treatments for life threatening orphan diseases.7 The EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights (section 35, 2000/C 364/01),
which the 25 EU member states acknowledged as part of the
Constitution for Europe in June 2004, states that ‘‘Everyone
has the right of access to preventive health care and the right
to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions
established by national laws and practices’’. The main
problem of a rights based approach to decisions about
resource allocation is that even when a right to health care
is embodied in national legislation its scope is open to
interpretation. The other limitation is that legal rights can
only apply to the provision of existing treatment options, but
it is difficult to imagine an enforceable individual right to
research funding for non-existing treatments. A right to
health care for individuals affected by orphan diseases can
thus only be a social right or a general moral obligation.
However, if one agrees on a societal moral obligation of
solidarity it is questionable why the important decisions on
priority setting for orphan drug research and development
are left to the pharmaceutical industry,7 which public bodies
only approve a posteriori to decide whether industrial pro-
posals justify public sponsorship or not. Public–private
partnerships (PPPs) can be one way to improve the current
situation, and at least the African onchocerciasis PPP has
been very successful in channelling industry funds into a
hitherto underresearched tropical parasitosis.23 In a recent
survey by Me´decins Sans Frontie`res and Harvard School of
Public Health, six of 11 multinational pharmaceutical com-
panies reported participation in PPPs for tropical diseases,
with individual financial commitments ranging from
US$500 000 to US$4 million.3
Beneficence
Beauchamp and Childress understand beneficence broadly,
including ‘‘all forms of action intended to benefit other
persons’’ or ‘‘to contribute to their welfare’’.24 Beneficence
requires that agents take positive steps to help others, not
merely refrain from harmful acts, or to treat individuals
autonomously. The principle of beneficence refers to a moral
obligation to further their important and legitimate interests.
Beauchamp and Childress distinguish two major principles of
beneficence: positive beneficence and utility.24 The former
requires agents to provide benefits, and the latter requires
that agents balance benefits, risks, and costs.24
The utilitarian understanding of the principle of benefi-
cence has been outlined above with regard to funding
decisions for orphan drug research. To discuss the notion of
positive beneficence in this context, we now consider the
moral obligation of non-abandonment and medicine’s role in
advancing scientific knowledge as a professional and societal
moral obligation.
Non-abandonment
Landman and Henley proposed a basic moral and public
policy commitment to non-abandonment of individuals with
needs for highly specialised health care when making policies
for rationing and resource reallocation, even in resource
constrained settings.25 The concept of non-abandonment may
also be useful to reasoning about orphan diseases which
received their designation because they are considered to be
abandoned by free market incentive systems for drug
research and development.
The laws and regulations passed in recent years to provide
incentives for orphan drug research could be interpreted as
attempts of democratic society to pursue the principle of non-
abandonment and to counteract distributive injustice caused
by market incentives. The subsidies, tax breaks, and other
fiscal benefits offered to industry as incentives have oppor-
tunity costs, and resource allocation on the principle of non-
abandonment may not maximise society’s utility according to
standard utilitarian and economic theory. However, some
authors recognise the existence of ‘‘caring externalities’’,26
where individuals derive utility from the satisfaction of
providing help to those in need. Thus, pursuing actions based
on beneficence does not necessarily conflict with utilitarian
reasoning.
Scientific advancement
Rhodes has argued that medicine as a profession has a
generally accepted duty to advance scientific knowledge in
pursuing new therapies, and this justifies some overriding of
short term utility considerations.27 Indeed, many professional
medical bodies, such as the Royal College of Physicians of
London have among their declared purposes promotion of
advance of medical knowledge.28 Leading organisations in
international health argue for increased funding for research
on tropical diseases. They apply the standard priority setting
tools used to inform decisions on allocation of scarce health
care resources to the allocation of research funds.19 The Ad
hoc Committee on Health Research proposed a five step
process starting with measurement of burden of disease,
followed by risk factor analysis, assessment of the knowledge
base, cost effectiveness analysis, and calculation of the
present level of investment into research for the condition/
risk factor under question.29 This process might be applicable
to public research funding of prevalent tropical diseases but
any rare disease will again be neglected.
Many rare diseases, however, merit scientific study for
reasons other than prevalence or because of moral obligations
of distributive justice or non-abandonment. William Harvey
recognised this in 1657, when he wrote to a Dutch physician
that ‘‘Nature is nowhere accustomed more openly to display
her secret mysteries than in cases where she shows traces of
her workings apart from the beaten path; nor is there any
better way to advance the proper practice of medicine than to
give our minds to the discovery of the usual law of Nature by
careful investigation of cases of rarer forms of disease.’’30
Now venture capitalists have rediscovered that the study of
rare diseases often repays research efforts manifold with
medical insights and useful drugs for common conditions.31–33
The main reason for this is the fact that many rare diseases
result from single gene alterations producing a single
defective protein, enabling scientists to see the consequences
of the defect with clarity close to that of a controlled
laboratory experiment.31 A good example is the study of
homozygous familial hypercholesterolaemia, which led to the
development of statins.31 Prior to orphan drug legislation
little research was done on orphan diseases. However, the
number of new compounds marketed for use in orphan
diseases has increased substantially in all countries following
orphan drug legislation.6 In the USA, 1261 drugs have
received orphan status designation since 198334 compared
with 10 drugs which received orphan status in the decade
before 1983.31 In the EU, 140 drugs were granted orphan
status between April 2000 and May 2003.35 Of a total of 1395
new drugs approved between 1975 and 1999 in the EU, only
13 drugs (1%) were specifically indicated for a tropical
disease.3
Funding medical science in general has been considered as
fulfilling a moral obligation of beneficence for existing
patients who are given hope that treatments might be
developed to cure them,7 and as a societal commitment to
provide potential benefits for future generations.
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CONCLUSIONS
To date, ethical aspects of priority setting for research
funding have not been a major issue of discussion in the
academic bioethics debate. Research ethics is primarily
concerned with protecting participants in clinical research
and conflicts of interest of clinical researchers funded by
industry, whereas the debate on fair distribution of resources
in health care is limited to existing treatments.
Both types of orphan disease—that is, rare diseases and
tropical diseases—present different ethical challenges to
questions of allocating research funds. For both types the
conflict between principles of distributive justice based on
utilitarian or legal rights and principles of beneficence based
on social or moral obligations is at the forefront. However, a
more detailed analysis reveals that very different moral issues
are at stake in each case. Utilitarian theory, and with it
priority setting tools based on economic evaluation, fail rare
disorders whereas frequently occurring tropical diseases fit
into the utilitarian framework. However, the latter present
the difficulty of where to draw the boundaries of moral
obligations of beneficence or distributive justice. Should
these be determined by national boundaries, political con-
stituencies, or economic influence or industrial profitability?
Standard tools used for priority setting in health care are
considered inadequate for allocating research funds because
of the extreme uncertainty of future benefits on investment.
For rare diseases future benefits are particularly difficult to
predict because of their, on average, increased potential for
scientific breakthroughs but otherwise very limited markets
and low profitability. Investing in research into rare diseases
offers hope to those in need and potential benefits for future
generations. These benefits, however, are difficult to quantify
and incorporate into quantitative priority setting tools.
Both principles of justice and beneficence support a
stronger role for the public sector in deciding on priority
setting for orphan drug research funding. A public policy that
prioritises, decides on choices, defines methodologies, and
provides public funding for orphan drug research and
development has already been proposed on ethical grounds
by Pabst.7
Transparent public processes of decision making with
participation of relevant civil society organisation, for
example patient interest groups, would at least guarantee
procedural justice, even if social justice for people affected by
orphan diseases still remains a somewhat elusive and
theoretical aim rather than an easily applicable concept for
priority setting.8
Daniels and Sabin have proposed a process for priority
setting they have called ‘‘accountability for reasonableness’’.36
Their framework requires that a fair priority setting process
meets four conditions. Firstly, the rationale for decisions
must be publicly accessible. Secondly, decisions about meet-
ing healthcare needs must be contextually relevant to fair
minded people. Thirdly, allowance must be made for appeals
so that previous decisions can be reconsidered in the light of
new evidence or arguments. Fourthly, there must be a
process of enforcement that facilitates the implementation of
the last three conditions.36
Public debate and participative and transparent procedures
are as important for decisions on research funding for rare
diseases in industrialised countries as they are for the
allocation of funds for global health research. But this can
only be a first step to address, what Benatar and Singer37 have
called one of the greatest ethical challenges in today’s
world—the unconscionable inequities in global health.
Improvement of existing tools for priority setting in global
health research are urgently needed in the light of recent
proposals to substantially increase funding for international
health research.2
To date, pharmaceutical regulation has mainly provided
incentives for research and marketing of drugs for rare
diseases, and a number of national, bilateral, and interna-
tional agencies fund research into neglected diseases in poor
countries.38 Others like the Global Forum on Health Research
seek to help correct the 10/90 gap in health research and
focus research efforts on the health problems of the poor by
bringing together key actors and creating a movement for
analysis and debate on health research priorities, the
allocation of resources, public–private partnerships and
access for all people to the outcomes of health research.39
The creation of new, independent bodies at the international
level offers important opportunities to stimulate research in
hitherto neglected fields of health needs and to increase the
transparency of resource flows for research and health care.2 4
However, these organisations do not have the political
legitimacy in the sense elected national governments do.
Yet some, like the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria, already control and allocate substantial funds
for healthcare evaluation and research. Created in 2002, the
Global Fund has committed US$3.1 billion to more than 250
two year programmes in nearly 130 countries. It plans to
disburse nearly US$1 billion to over 200 programmes by the
end of 2004.40
In view of the growing influence of these new agencies,
new ways to secure a high level of public accountability are
required. This demand also applies to other institutions
which issue national or international regulation relevant to
pharmaceuticals—for example, drug regulatory authorities or
the World Trade Organization.
The level, process, and outcome of the allocation of
resources for health research, and in particular for rare or
tropical diseases, can be expected to provide new ethical
challenges in the global health policy arena.
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